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Registering Offense: The Prohibition of Slurs as Trademarks 
 








In what way does trademark law either promote diversity or protect the interests of 
diverse communities?  Facially at least, the U.S. Trademark Act (Lanham Act) seeks to prevent 
the disparagement of persons.  Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act prohibits the registration of marks 
that consist of matter that may disparage or bring into contempt or disrepute any person, 
institution, or belief.
1
  This provision would thus appear to bar discriminatory language or hate 
speech from being registered as a trademark.  Significantly, neither this provision, nor any other 
section of the trademark act prohibits the use of disparaging trademarks.  Only the registration of 
disparaging trademarks is prohibited.  Is it thus possible for such a limited protection to promote 
diversity? 
 
Limited as it may be, the refusal of the U.S. Trademark and Patent Office (USPTO) to 
grant federal registration to offensive marks plays some role in protecting the public from racist 
or otherwise highly offensive trademarks.  The USPTO does so even though such actions may 
appear to some as a form of censorship and even though such determinations may embroil the 
office and courts in differing standards of cultural sensitivity.  Were the USPTO less committed 
to these policy goals, it might instead play it safe and stick with determinations that are more 
germane to trademark law.  These policy choices come with obvious challenges, but ultimately 
indicate that trademark law may have a role to play in fostering civility and diversity.  
 
In this Chapter, I first will consider the policy goals and challenges of barring the 
registration of offensive marks through the ongoing dispute over the REDSKINS mark for the 
professional American football team in Washington, D.C.  Building upon this analysis, I will 
address today’s practices of registering disparaging and otherwise offensive trademarks in 
general, and highlight the limited role of Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act in addressing the 
problems deriving from these registrations. I will conclude the Chapter by raising policy 
                                                 

 Professor, American University Washington College of Law. Please send comments to cfarley@wcl.american.edu.  
I am grateful for the helpful feedback I received from Ann Bartow, Irene Calboli, Leah Chan Grinvald, Glynn 
Lunney, Jessica Silbey, Rebecca Tushnet, and Mary Wong at the American University Trademark Works in 
Progress Colloquium, and the outstanding research assistance I received from Kristin Lockhart. 
1
 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2006)  
(No trademark by which the goods of the applicant may be distinguished from the goods of others 
shall be refused registration on the principal register on account of its nature unless it—(a) 
Consists of or comprises immoral, deceptive, or scandalous matter; or matter which may disparage 
or falsely suggest a connection with persons, living or dead, institutions, beliefs, or national 
symbols, or bring them into contempt . . . .)   
(I will refer to this list of prohibited matter in the shorthand of “immoral, scandalous, or disparaging” marks). 
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2443423 
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arguments in favor of restricting disparaging and otherwise offensive content in the form of 
registered trademarks under the Lanham Act.   
 
 
II. Trademarking the “R Word” and the Harm Caused by Offensive Marks 
 
A. History and Developments of the REDSKINS Dispute 
 
The REDSKINS marks have been the subject of organized protest since 1968 and 
ongoing litigation in U.S. courts since 1992.
2
  This dispute has garnered more attention and 
interest in Section 2(a) and its attendant issues than any other dispute or case under that section 
thus far. 
   
Between 1967 and 1990, Pro-Football Inc. registered six marks containing the word 
“redskins.”
3
  The word “redskin” is generally understood to be a derogatory racial epithet that 
refers to Native Americans.  Many believe that the term “redskins” comes from a time “when 
bounties were offered for the murder of Native Americans” and the term refers to scalping.
4
  
Native American organizations—including the National Congress of American Indians, the 
National Indian Education Association, the Native American Journalists Association, the Native 
American Rights Fund, the Morning Star Institute, the International Indian Treaty Council, and 
the National Indian Youth Council—have publicly and vociferously opposed the continued use 
of the term “redskin” in trademarks or as the name of sports teams.  Suzan Shown Harjo, the lead 
plaintiff in the first trademark challenge, refrains from using the word and instead refers to it as 
the “R word,” finding it analogous to the “N word.”
5
  The director of the Smithsonian National 
Museum of the American Indian has stated that he considers the name to be the most offensive 
name in current use.
6
   
 
A group of seven prominent Native American leaders first challenged the REDSKINS 
trademarks in the USPTO in 1992 as disparaging under Section 2(a).  They petitioned the 
                                                 
2
 Public protest of the name began in 1968, with a resolution by the National Congress of American Indians.  See 
ENDING THE LEGACY OF RACISM IN SPORTS & THE ERA OF HARMFUL INDIAN MASCOTS, NATIONAL CONGRESS OF 
AMERICAN INDIANS 18-20 (Oct. 2013), 
http://www.ncai.org/attachments/PolicyPaper_mijApMoUWDbjqFtjAYzQWlqLdrwZvsYfakBwTHpMATcOroYol
pN_NCAI_Harmful_Mascots_Report_Ending_the_Legacy_of_Racism_10_2013.pdf [hereinafter ENDING THE 
LEGACY OF RACISM IN SPORTS].  
3
 See Harjo v. Pro Football, Inc., 30 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1828, 1829 (T.T.A.B. 1994). 
4




 Suzan Shown Harjo, Dirty Word Games, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY (June 22, 2005), 
http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2005/06/22/dirty-word-games-96506.  
6
 See Brett Zongker, American Indian Museum Tackles Racism in U.S. Sports, WTOP LOCAL NEWS (Feb. 7, 2013, 
5:42 AM), http://www.wtop.com/41/3219546/American-Indian-museum-tackles-racism-in-US-sports (finding that 
some understand the word “redskins” to be the equivalent of the “n-word.”).   
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2443423 
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Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) to cancel all six marks that contain the word 
“redskins.”  To prove that the marks may disparage Native Americans or bring them into 
contempt or disrepute, petitioners presented the TTAB with the following evidence: dictionary 
definitions, reference works, written sources regarding meaning and use of “redskin,” examples 
of “redskin” used in a derogatory manner in written work and movies, the team’s own use of 
name and marks in ways that mocked Native Americans, the expert testimony of linguists, the 
results of a survey, resolutions by the National Congress of American Indians (NCAI), and the 
opposition of other Native American groups and individuals.  In 1999, the TTAB issued a 145 
page opinion canceling all of the trademarks.  The TTAB ruled that as of the date of 
registrations, “redskins” as used in connection with the marks refers to Native Americans, and a 
substantial composite of Native Americans would consider the term disparaging.
7
   
 
The team then brought an appeal by way of a civil action to the District Court for the 
District of D.C., which granted summary judgment in favor of the team.  The court held that the 
Native American plaintiffs’ claims were barred by laches since they were unjustifiably delayed 
in bringing the action when some of the trademarks had already been registered for as long as 25 
years by the time of the lawsuit.
8
  Yet, in a previous decision, the TTAB ruled that laches did not 
apply because matters of broad public policy are not subject to the equitable defense of laches.
9
  
The district court’s ruling was ultimately upheld by the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.
10
   
Thereafter, the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari.
11
   
 
As a result of the laches ruling, a new group of five younger Native Americans brought 
another challenge in 2006, again petitioning the TTAB to cancel the six REDSKINS 
registrations.
12
  Since one cannot be held to have delayed in bringing a legal claim before 
reaching the age of majority, this group of young adults appears to have overcome any criticism 
of delay in the new lawsuit by bringing their claims at an early age of adulthood.  Since the 
parties stipulated to the record presented in the previous case, the facts of delay are the only 
difference between the two cases.  A hearing in the case was held before the TTAB in March 
2013 and we await a new ruling, which could be issued at any moment, although it will no doubt 
be followed by many more years of appeals. 
 
Due to the attention this litigation generated about the REDSKINS trademark and the 
frustration with the courts’ rulings, a bill was introduced in the U.S. Congress to provide a 
legislative fix to the problem.  On March 20, 2013, Congressman Eni F.H. Faleomavaega 
(American Samoa), along with nineteen other bi-partisan co-sponsors, introduced the Non-
                                                 
7
 Harjo v. Pro Football, Inc., 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705 (T.T.A.B. 1999). 
8
 Pro Football, Inc. v. Harjo, 284 F. Supp. 2d 96 (D.D.C. 2003). 
9
 Harjo v. Pro Football, Inc., 30 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1828, 1833 (T.T.A.B. 1994). 
10
 See Pro-Football, Inc. v. Harjo, 565 F.3d 880, 880-81 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
11
 Harjo, 565 F.3d 880 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 631 (2009). 
12




Disparagement of Native American Persons or Peoples in Trademark Registration Act to amend 
the U.S. Trademark Act to prohibit the registration of the word “redskins.”
13
  The bill states:  
 
Section 2(a) of the Trademark Act of 1946 (15 U.S.C. 1052(a)) is amended by 
adding at the end the following: “A mark consisting of or including the term 
‘redskin’ or any derivation of the term ‘redskin’ shall be conclusively presumed to 
consist of matter which may disparage persons if (1) the mark has been, is, or is 
intended to be used in commerce in connection with references to or images of 
one or more Native American persons or peoples, or to Native American persons 
or peoples in general; or (2) the Director determines that the term as included in 
the mark is commonly understood to refer to one or more Native Americans 




In reaction to the publicity over the trademark dispute, a segment of the general public 
has renounced the team name.  Many fans of the team, including the Mayor of Washington D.C., 
and major sportscasters such as Bob Costas, avoid using the name and instead refer to the team 
as “the Washington football team.”
15
  Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid and House Minority 
Leader Nancy Pelosi, as well as other members of Congress, have publicly spoken out about the 
name.
16
  Even President Obama has publically stated: “If I were the owner of the team and I 
knew that there was a name of my team — even if it had a storied history — that was offending a 
sizeable group of people, I’d think about changing it.”
17
   
 
Based on the time and effort expended on this dispute, Native American leaders 
obviously feel that this is an important civil rights issue.  Between the evidence produced in the 
litigation, the amicus curiae briefs filed with the Supreme Court, and the public discussion 
generated by the dispute, a clearer understanding of the harms of registering offensive 
trademarks has emerged.  The social costs to the public are huge and include reinforcing hateful 
stereotypes and misinformation about fellow citizens.  The psychological effects of such 
racialized representations are at once to the referenced group and also to society as a whole. 
 
B. The Harm Caused by Offensive Trademarks 
 
                                                 
13
 Non-Disparagement of Native American Persons or Peoples in Trademark Registration Act of 2013, H.R. 1278, 
113th Cong. (2013).  
14
 Id. §4.  
15
 Mike Florio, D.C. Mayor Backpedals on Redskins Name Change, NBC SPORTS (Feb. 11, 2013, 8:42 AM), 
http://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2013/02/11/d-c-mayor-backpedals-on-redskins-name-change/.  
16









Recent psychological evidence has demonstrated the negative effects associated with 
stereotypical and derogatory references to Native American people.
18
  A group of psychologists 
filed an amicus curiae brief at the Supreme Court that cogently argues that racially charged 
trademarks have myriad negative impacts on minority populations including the perpetuation of 
harmful stereotypes and the promotion of discrimination.  Research in this area suggests that the 
use of ethnic slurs, whether intentionally or unintentionally, “conveys hatred and hostility toward 
the target group.”
19
  According to the brief authors, the repeated use of ethnic slurs and 




   
The authors cite research demonstrating that the use of Native American mascots:  
 
(1) perpetuate a narrow and false public perception of American Indian culture 
and identity, thereby diminishing and degrading such identity; (2) diminish the 
self-esteem of American Indian individuals; and (3) correspondingly enhance the 
self-esteem of European Americans, at the expense of American Indians.
21
   
 
Ethnic slurs and stereotypes have invidious public and private impacts.  Strikingly, 
research shows that groups that are subject to ethnic slurs: 
 
were less likely to marry native-born Americans; more likely to participate in 
ethnic fraternal associations; more likely to be segregated into ethnic 
neighborhoods; more likely to be deemed suitable for hazardous work; less likely 
to become naturalized citizens; and more likely to be subjected to harsher 
immigration quota restrictions, . . . [and] were more likely to be portrayed to 




Moreover, and especially relevant to the Native American population, research suggests that 
ethnic groups targeted by racial slurs have higher suicide rates than other groups.
23
   
 
Of course, these stereotypes also affect how non-Native Americans view Native 
Americans.  A White Paper by the NCAI emphasized research by Dr. Fryberg suggests that these 
stereotypes also contribute to violence against Native Americans: 
 
                                                 
18
 Brief of Psychol. Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 14, Pro Football, Inc. v. Harjo, 565 F.3d 
880 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (No. 03–7162) [hereinafter Brief]. 
19
 Id. at 11. 
20
 Id. at 2. 
21
 Id. at 14-15.   
22
 Id. at 11-12 (quoting Brian Mullen, Complexity and Valence in Ethnophaulisms and Exclusion of Ethnic Out-
Groups: What Puts the "Hate" Into Hate Speech?, 96 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 170, 172 (Jan. 2009)). 
23
 Id. at 12 (citing Brian Mullen & Joshua M. Smyth, Immigrant Suicide Rates as a Function of Ethnophaulisms: 
Hate Speech Predicts Death, 66 PSYCHOSOMATIC MED. 343, 343 (2004)). 
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The intolerance and harm promoted by “Indian” mascots have very real 
consequences. The alarmingly high rates of hate crimes against Native people 
indicates a need to take immediate action in a number of areas, including the 
removal of harmful images and education of the general public to diffuse 
additional hateful activity against Native peoples.  According to Department of 
Justice analysis, “American Indians are more likely than people of other races to 




These studies demonstrate that exposure to Native American mascots depresses the self-
esteem, erodes the self-confidence, damages the sense of identity, diminishes the feelings of 
community worth and limits the aspirations of Native American youth.
25
 Significantly, these 
harmful effects were present even when the mascot was not considered to be “negative” by the 
affected individual.
26
  That is, even the so-called “honorific” Native American mascots can be 
harmful because a stereotype does not have to be negative to have a dehumanizing impact on the 
individual and the rest of society.  Public stereotypical representations play the same role as 
racist institutionalized policies and practices.  They devalue culture and pose a continuing threat 
to identity.  Individuals need to feel safe, valued, and respected in order to contribute to their full 
potential.  In the case of marks and mascots referring to Native Americans, the effect is 
particularly pernicious as Native Americans make up only 1.5% of the U.S. population
27
 and 
non-Natives will likely encounter a Native American depicted on sports team t-shirt far more 
frequently than they would encounter an actual Native American.      
 
Besides this psychological harm, an additional and more symbolic harm occurs when 
someone’s cultural identity is literally, and legally, owned by another entity, regardless of 
whether the racial referent that is registered as a mark may be considered disparaging. By 
trademarking a racial referent, the message is that the referent is owned,
28
 and the owner has the 
legal right to use the racial term; perhaps even the obligation to use it.  The owner of the mark 
thus controls the use of the racial word including where it appears and with what it is associated.  
Thus, in the case of a word or image for Native Americans, the mark’s owner gets to decide 
whether to depict a fierce warrior, such as Pro-Football’s mark, or a pathetic clown-like figure, 
such as the Chief Wahoo logo owned by the Cleveland Indians baseball team.
29
  Adopting a 
                                                 
24
 See ENDING THE LEGACY OF RACISM IN SPORTS, supra note 2, at 5. 
25
 Brief, supra note 18, at 14-15 (citing Stephanie Fryberg, Of Warrior Chiefs and Indian Princesses, 30 BASIC & 
APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 208, 209 (2008)). 
26
 Brief, supra note 18, at 17.   
27
 Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR: INDIAN AFFAIRS, http://www.bia.gov/FAQs/ 
(last updated Apr. 11, 2014 6:44 PM).  
28
 See ROSEMARY J. COOMBE, THE CULTURAL LIFE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTIES: AUTHORSHIP, APPROPRIATION, 
AND THE LAW 175, 197 (1998) (“Many Native American names, for example, are far more prominent due to their 
mass reproduction as trademarks than are their original referents . . . reiterat[ing] the injury” by reminding them “of 
their symbolic status as an invisible and vanishing peoples, whose images serve primarily as effigies in the national 
imagination.”).  
29
 CLEVELAND INDIANS, Registration No. 1283304.  This mark was cancelled on November 29, 1990 because 
the registrant failed to an acceptable declaration under Section 8.  
7 
 
racialized mark is a statement that the owner is so insensitive to the pain it causes that they have 
blithely built a business around it.  And by going into business under harmful words, the owner 
also causes others—fans and consumers—to endlessly utter them.     
 
The public discourse prompted by the REDSKIN litigation has helped the White majority 
better understand why Native Americans are offended by the mark.  Although Pro-Football 
characterizes the mark as honorific, the logo as a noble depiction of a Native American, and their 
use of the marks as positive, the appropriation of Native American identity is nevertheless 
announced to the world.  This appropriation, no matter how “honorific,” invites fans and 
consumers to invoke stereotypes.  Hence warpaths, headdresses, tomahawks, silly dances and 
other acts of mockery are enabled.  An excellent political cartoon captures this offence in one 
frame where a White man outfitted in a loincloth, war paint and headdress, carrying a beer in one 
hand and a pennant in the other that reads, “Go Warrior Savages,” says to a disappointed looking 





III. The Phenomenon of Offensive Trademarks 
 
A. Beyond the REDSKINS: A Closer Look at Today’s Practices 
 
The REDSKINS dispute may be the most notorious example of an offensive trademark in 
the U.S., but it is not an isolated case.  Offensive trademarks, unfortunately, are not merely 
relicts of a bygone era.  While it is true that some trademarks are particularly offensive because 
they were registered in a previous time when our sensitivity to racist or sexist language was 
lower than it may be today, offensive trademarks have emerged as a more recent phenomenon as 
well.
31
   
 
We must consider the historical use of racially charged trademarks in order to understand 
the present spectacle.  Besides REDSKINS, other older racist marks include SAMBO’S, 
ESKIMO PIE, CRAZY HORSE, and FRITO BANDITO.
32
  In other cases, the brand names 
                                                 
30
 Lalo Alcaraz, Editorial Cartoon (2002), available at http://pocho.com/wp-
content/uploads/2014/04/savagesmascottoon2002.jpg.  
31
 See Ex parte Martha Maid Mfg. Co., 37 U.S.P.Q. 156 (Comm’r Pats. 1938) (denied registration of QUEEN 
MARY for underwear); In re P.J. Valckenberg, GMBH, 122 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 334 (T.T.A.B. 1959) (denying 
registration to MADONNA for wines); In re Runsdorf, 171 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 443 (T.T.A.B. 1971) (finding the mark 
BUBBY TRAP for bras to be offensive).  For an exhaustive list and analysis of marks denied registration on Section 
2(a) grounds, see Anne Gilson LaLonde & Jerome Gilson, Trademarks Laid Bare: Marks That May Be Scandalous 
or Immoral, 101 TRADEMARK REP. 1476 (2011). 
32
 U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 77,915048 (filed Jan. 19, 2010); ESKIMO PIE, Registration No. 893953 
(for frozen foods); CRAZY HORSE, Registration No. 3044028 (for entertainment services in the form of exotic 
dance performances); FRITO BANDITO, Registration No. 0875271 (for puffed corn snacks).  Another example, the 
AMOS AND ANDY mark, was abandoned for non-use because it was racist.  Silverman v. CBS Inc., 870 F.2d 40 
(2d Cir. 1989).  Rosemary Coombe cites other examples such as Cherokee, Oneida, Winnebago and Red Man 
chewing tobacco.  See Rosemary J. Coombe, Embodied Trademarks: Mimesis and Alterity on American 
Commercial Frontiers, 11 CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 202 (1996). 
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alone were not racist, but the brand image associated with the product was.  Uncle Ben’s, Aunt 
Jemima, Robertson’s, Cream of Wheat, and Chiquita are all examples of racist stereotypes being 
used as trademarks.
33
  In each of these cases, the offensive stereotype used in the packaging and 




As Rosemary Coombe points out, use of the imagery of “others,” especially Eskimos, 
Hawaiians, Indians, and Blacks, was predominant at the creation of mass markets.  Rather than 
mere coincidence, this imagery was deliberately employed.  Mass advertised trademarks that 
accentuated the ethnic differences of some Americans in turn tended to deemphasize the cultural 
differences of others and thereby create an “American” consumer.
35
  Nearly a century later, the 
Washington D.C. of 1967, the year Pro-Football first registered the REDSKINS mark, was a city 
preoccupied with race and racial tensions.  Perhaps the overt use of racial difference was to 
downplay the differences among Washington D.C. residents and the football team’s fans by 
contrasting those differences with the differences between the fan base and the savage 
primitiveness of the Indian depicted by the team.  While the racial difference experienced by 
city’s fans might have been a source of confusion and anxiety, the racial difference displayed by 
the mark was something easily recognized and consumed. 
 
Sadly, it appears that offensive trademarks are now on the rise.  In fact, there may be 
reason to believe that the problem is increasing rather than decreasing.
36
  A recent search of the 
U.S. Trademark Office database reveals an alarming number of offensive trademark applications 
for registration as well as issued registrations containing offensive words.  These marks are 
offensive because they are racist, misogynist, and religiously intolerant.  For example, there is a 
registration for SLUTMAGNET for shirts and musical group entertainment services,
37
 an 
application for registration for WHITE TRASH for trash bags,
38
 an application for I EAT 
PUSSY WITH A FORK for T-shirts,
39
 an application for SHANK THE B!T@H for board 
games,
40
 an application for DEGO for tequila,
41
 and an application for WILD INJUN for “plastic 
frame assembly for holding a ball-cap when washed in a washing machine or dishwasher.”
42
  
                                                 
33
 UNCLE BEN’S, Registration No. 2516392 (for rice); AUNT JEMIMA, Registration No. 1697862 (for pancake 
and waffle mix and table syrup); ROBERTSON’S, Registration No. 3629301 (for jerky and other meat products); 
CREAM OF WHEAT, Registration No. 4099162 (for cereals and other breakfast foods); CHIQUITA, Registration 
No. 4064603 (for dipping sauces).  
34
 Kim Bhasin & Karlee Weinmann, 12 Uncomfortably Racist Vintage Brand Mascots, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 8, 2011, 
1:09 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/racist-company-mascots-2011-9?op=1.  
35
 Coombe, Embodied Trademarks, supra note 32, at 209. 
36
 David Boyle, “For Fcuk's Sake – Brands Are Swearing More Than Ever,” The Guardian (Apr. 28, 2014); John 
Grossman, “Risqué Names Reap Rewards for Some Companies,” NY Times (Apr. 23, 2014). 
37
 SLUTMAGNET, U.S. Registration No. 2,404,415.  
38
 U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 85,510,369 (filed Jan. 6, 2012). 
39
 U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 86,128,843 (filed Nov. 25, 2013).  
40
 U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 85,301,216 (filed Apr. 21, 2011).  
41
 U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 86,102,857 (filed Oct. 28, 2013).  
42
 U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 75,627,642 (Jan. 26, 1999).  A company has registered the trademark 
BITCH for beer.  BITCH, U.S. Reg. No. 2,448,202 (May 1, 2001).  Other shocking applications for registration 
include JEWFRO, U.S. Registration No. 3,300,680 (Oct. 2, 2007); JEWBUTT, U.S. Registration No. 3,491,905 
9 
 
These examples provide a glimpse of the range and type of offensive word marks that are being 
pursued.   
 
As to the pervasiveness of the interest in offensive trademarks, while no empirical 
research yet exists, a search for trademark applications and registrations involving the word 
“bitch” returns hundreds of records and most of them are recent.  Likewise, “pussy” and “fuck” 
produce a large number of results.  Many of these applications involve plays on words.  For 
instance, a recent application to register the mark COCK SUCKER was for chocolate lollipops 




Why would anyone even invest the $325 application fee
44
 to register offensive words?
45
  
The propertization of offensive speech is an interesting, but troubling phenomenon.  Of course, 
we are also witness to an explosion of intellectual property exploitation.  And in the case of 
offensive trademarks, these two phenomena have combined forces.  Whatever proves to attract 
attention, intellectual property will be there providing exclusive rights to the savvy merchant.  If 
a trendy new brand gets a response from the public, trademark law ensures a monopoly for the 
first user.  Thus, the law must confront these new marketing practices. 
 
B. Marketing Practices and Offensive Trademarks 
 
In an effort to be noticed in an era of overwhelmed and distracted consumers, marketers 
have resorted to some base tactics.  It is increasingly common to encounter indecent trademarks 
or marks that deliberately cross a line.  The goal is to get attention.  Offensive trademarks are one 
type of marketing that is not easily ignored. 
 
For example, an Italian jeans company uses the trademark JESUS JEANS.  It has applied 
for trademark registration in countries all over the world including the United States.  In one ad 
campaign, a woman's derrière fills the screen and is barely covered by a teeny pair of cutoff jean 
shorts.  The text reads: “He who loves me follows me.”
46
  In another ad, the image is a close-up 
of a woman's pelvic area with her jeans, tight and unzipped.  The text reads: “Thou shalt not 
                                                                                                                                                             
(Aug. 26, 2008); NEW PUSSY SMELL, U.S. Serial No. 86,136,180 (filed Dec. 5, 2013); and WIFE’S A BITCH, 
U.S. Serial. No. 86,090,187 (filed Oct. 12, 2013). 
43
 In re Fox, 702 F.3d 633, 640 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (upholding the T.T.A.B.’s decision to deny registration of the mark, 
finding that one of the meanings of the mark was offensive under § 2(a) of the Lanham Act).   
44
 Or $375 for a paper application.  See UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, CURRENT FEE SCHEDULE 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/qs/ope/fee031913.htm. 
45
 Although I am mostly dealing with offensive words and word marks, it is of course possible that logos, designs, 
shapes, and packaging pose the same issues.  See, e.g., In re Luxuria s.r.o., 100 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1146 (T.T.A.B. 
2011) (finding a mark consisting of a bottle in the shape of a hand with middle finger extended upwards 
scandalous). 
46
 Apparently, the Catholic Church denounced this ad when it ran in the 1970s in Italy. See Jacob Gershman, If You 
Take These Jeans' Name in Vain, Prepare to Meet Their Maker: Italian Apparel Company Registered 'Jesus' as 




have any other jeans but me.”
47
  These ads not only push the sex buttons, but also attempt to 
provoke religious sensitivities.   
 
Increasingly, brands want to provoke a “wow!” response from consumers.  In a case 
brought against an Australian beer company that launched a new beer called DUFF, there was 
evidence of a marketing study that indicated how the young adult demographic is attracted to 
brands that generate humor and wonderment.
48
  Indeed, the marketing literature suggests that the 
use of humor in advertising not only enhances the attention the brand receives, but also enhances 
purchase intention.
49
  And so we see marketing campaigns with quirky humor that do not even 
advertise the product or service in any traditional way.  For example, the College Humor ad for 
Vitamin Water, which is one of the top five most viewed ads of 2013, never mentions or depicts 
the product or category of goods it is promoting.
50
  A related phenomenon is “Gonzo marketing.” 
As with Gonzo journalism, which involves the reporter becoming part of the story,
51
 gonzo 
marketing likewise involves marketers seemingly conversing with their markets rather than 
talking at them in the traditional one-sided manner.  The two also have in common the 
characteristics of humor and bad taste.  Gonzo implies shock value.  An example is the Maxi Pad 
video that responds to a man's Facebook rant, which of course went viral.
52
 
   
Sex sells. The use of sex in marketing is as old as the campaigns dreamed up by the ad 
men epitomized by Don Draper.  It has long been assumed that sex is used as a device to cause 
consumers to stop, look, and listen or at least notice specific messages in the context of media 
clutter.  And while advertisers are upping the ante, they do so based on marketing research that 
suggests that younger audiences are less offended by sexually explicit messages.
53
  The FCUK 
mark for the brand French Connection is aimed at this group.
54
  Because the FCUK trademark is 








  See Twentieth Century Fox v. S. Austl. Brewing Co. [1996] 66 FCR 451 (Austl.). 
49
 Martin Eisend, A Meta-Analysis of Humor in Advertising, 37 J. OF THE ACAD. OF MARKETING SCI. 191, 192 (2009) 
(conducting a study that showed a positive correlation between the “funniness” of the ad and positive attitudes about 
the advertised brand). 
50
 See College Humor, Panhandler Pranks Entire Subway, YOUTUBE (Aug. 5, 2013), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QjFoDTPeX6U#t=80.  
51
 See Christopher Locke, Fear and Loathing on the Web: “Gonzo” Marketing Thrives, CNN.COM (July 16, 1998, 
4:45 PM), http://www.cnn.com/TECH/computing/9807/16/gonzo.idg/ (quoting Hunter S. Thompson) (“The writer 
must be a participant in the scene while he's writing it.”). 
52
 See Bodyform, Bodyform Responds: The Truth, YOUTUBE (Oct. 16, 2012), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Bpy75q2DDow; see also Tim Nudd, See Maxipad Maker Bodyform's Brilliant 





 FCUK, U.S. Registration No. 4167152 (for retail stores featuring clothing, watches, and eyewear). 
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IV. The Role of Morality in Trademark Law 
 
A. The Impetus to Regulate Offensive Language 
 
Due to the continued use of offensive trademarks, there have been other attempts to 
protect the public from the use of racist trademarks.  Sometimes these regulations come not from 
the trademark office, and are not even part of trademark law.   For example, at roughly the same 
time that the cancellation petition against the REDSKINS trademarks was filed, another 
trademark offensive to Native Americans was receiving negative public attention.  The Hornell 
Brewing Company had begun selling a malt liquor under the name “Crazy Horse.”
55
  Crazy 
Horse was a revered Native American leader who strongly believed that use of alcohol would 
destroy Native American communities.  Due to the deep offense caused by this trademark, and to 
Hornell’s unwillingness to change the name, Congress enacted a law to address this specific 
problem: 
 
Upon the date of enactment of this Act, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and 
Firearms (ATF) shall deny any application for a certificate of label approval, 
including a certificate of label approval already issued, which authorizes the use 





The public outcry over Crazy Horse followed a similar episode over the restaurant chain 
called “Sambo’s.”  Sambo’s was a national family restaurant chain with over 1,000 outlets 
nationwide.   Although the name had been in use since its founding in 1957, it began to fall into 
disfavor because “sambo” is a derogatory reference to African Americans.  In the 1970s, a 
number of municipalities, such as Ann Arbor and Toledo, prohibited the use of the racially 
offensive business name by refusing to issue sign permits and through other measures.
57
  In the 
cases of both Crazy Horse and Sambo’s trademarks, the attempts to regulate the use—as opposed 
to the registration—of racist trademarks were each held to be unconstitutional restraints on First 
Amendment speech rights.
58
   
 
Protecting the public from offensive language is a policy goal difficult to achieve while 
maintaining strong free speech principles.  Numerous regulations attempt to protect the public 
from offensive speech, but every attempt to censor speech based on its content will be subject to 
the First Amendment.  Some regulations, like the attempts to ban the racist trademarks above, 
have been held to violate the First Amendment.  Other regulations of offensive speech have 
                                                 
55
 Hornell Brewing Co. v. Brady, 819 F. Supp. 1227 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (finding a First Amendment violation). 
56
 Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government Appropriations Act, 1993, Pub. L. No. 102-393, § 633 (1992). 
57
 Sambo's Restaurants, Inc. v. Ann Arbor, 663 F.2d 686 (6th Cir. 1981); Sambo's of Ohio, Inc. v. City Council of 
Toledo, 466 F. Supp. 177 (N.D. Ohio 1979).  
58
 Sambo’s of Ohio, Inc. v. City Council of Toledo, 466 F. Supp. 177 (N.D. Ohio 1979) (holding unconstitutional 
the City of Toledo’s revocation of permits to display the name Sambo's on the premises of a restaurant). 
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survived a First Amendment challenge, such as the Federal Communications Commission’s ban 
on “obscene,” “indecent,” and “profane” language in broadcasting
59
 and the various states’ ban 
on offensive or profane vanity license plates.
60
  Still other prohibitions of offensive speech have 
not been the subject of litigation.  For instance, some states prohibit nonprofits from adopting 
offensive corporate names,
61
 while the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers 
(ICANN) recently proscribed applications for new generic top level domains that are immoral or 




Thus, the impetus to protect the public from offensive trademarks is a policy goal 
difficult to achieve while maintaining strong free speech principles.  In all of these examples, 
regulators risk charges of censorship and its attendant problems in order that they might protect 
the public from being injured by offensive words.  The fact of the attempt to regulate offensive 
language demonstrates an understanding that the public can be injured by certain language.  
Moreover, these policies, in addition to protecting a minority from the offensive material, are 
also aimed at creating inclusiveness. 
 
B. A Common Feature of Trademark Law  
 
Many are surprised when they learn that the U.S. Trademark Act has a provision that 
regulates the offensiveness of trademarks.  U.S. federal trademark law, however, is not unique in 
prohibiting the registration of offensive trademarks.  Many countries’ trademark laws contain 
similar provisions.
63
  Indeed, international treaties such as the Paris Convention administered by 
                                                 
59
 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (2014).  This regulation was upheld as constitutional by the Supreme Court in 1978.  FCC v. 
Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978).  Since this decision, the USPTO has registered numerous marks containing 
each of the words banned by the FCC.  See Reagan Smith, Trademark Law and Free Speech: Protection for 
Scandalous and Disparaging Marks, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 451, 452 (2007). 
60
 Generally courts have found that states have a valid purpose in prohibiting vanity license plates that are offensive, 
profane or make reference to drugs or alcohol.  See Jack Achiezer Guggenheim & Jed M. Silversmith, Confederate 
License Plates at the Constitutional Crossroads: Vanity Plates, Special Registration Organization Plates, Bumper 
Stickers, Viewpoints, Vulgarity, and the First Amendment, 54 U. MIAMI L. REV. 563, 568 (2000); see, e.g., Higgins 
v. Driver & Motor Vehicle Servs. Branch, 335 Or. 481 (Or. 2003) (affirming administrative ruling that denied vanity 
license plate with the words WINE, INVINO, and VINO).     
61
 Some states will disqualify a nonprofit organization from receiving a tax-exempt status for use of offensive words 
in their corporate names.  See, e.g., N.Y. Not-for-Profit Corp. Law § 301(a)(8) (McKinney 2012) (This statute is 
currently being revised). 
62
 ICANN, gTLD Applicant Guidebook 1-42, 3-4, 3-6 (June 4, 2012)  (prohibiting new top-level domains (“TLDs”) 
that are “contrary to generally accepted legal norms relating to morality and public order that are recognized under 
international principles of law”), http://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/agb/guidebook-full-04jun12-en.pdf. (This 
restriction is not imposed by any government, but is the policy of ICANN who is in the process of delegating 
numerous new TLDs.) See Griffin M. Barnett, ICANN Standards for Morality and the New gTLDs: A Comparative 
Analysis of Morality in International Trademark Law in the Internet Age, 103 TRADEMARK REP. 1214 (2013). 
63
 United Kingdom Trade Marks Act, 1994, c. 26 § 3(3)(a) (“A trade mark shall not be registered if it is—(a) 
contrary to public policy or to accepted principles of morality”). Although 9(1)(j) of the Canadian Trade-Marks Act 
is similar, it “has received little attention by the courts in Canada.” TERESA SCASSA, CANADIAN TRADEMARK LAW 
154 (1st ed. 2010).  New Zealand’s Trademarks Act in Section 17(1)(c) requires a trademark to be rejected if the use 
or registration of the mark would likely “offend a significant section of the community.”  New Zealand also has a 
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the World Intellectual Property Organization contain provisions that anticipate the prohibition of 
trademarks that are contrary to morality or public order.
64
  This provision dates back to 1883 and 
was at that time the only ground for refusal or invalidation of a trademark in the treaty.
65
   
 
Most other countries’ trademark acts refer to “morality” and “public order” as a bar for 
trademark registration.
66
  European trademark law has adopted precisely this standard.
67
  
Although the U.S. trademark act refers to morality, it does not refer to public order and it is not 
clear why U.S. law has taken a different tact on this regulation.  Despite a difference in statutory 
language, most countries have similarly addressed the issues inherent in dealing with offensive 
trademarks. 
 
Furthermore, most state trademark acts have enacted prohibitions that mirror the 
language of Section 2(a).
68
  The Model State Trademark Bill similarly denies registration to 
offensive marks.
69






V. Understanding the Impact of Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act 
 
A. Beyond Disparaging: Other Offenses Addressed Under the Lanham Act 
 
In addition to disparaging trademarks, the registration of marks that are deemed 
“immoral” or “scandalous” are also barred from registration.  Under Section 2(a) of the Lanham 
Act, the trademark office must refuse the registration of any mark if it contains any of several 
itemized types of matter including “immoral, . . . or scandalous matter; or matter which may 
                                                                                                                                                             
separate provision that prohibits the registration of trademarks that disparage the Māori. See Paul Sumpter, 
Intellectual Property Law and the New Morality, 11 N.Z. BUS. L.Q. 216 (May 2005). 
64
 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, England–France–Sweden–United 
States, art. 6quinpuies, available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/paris/trtdocs_wo020.html (stating that a 
trademark can be denied registration if it is contrary to public order or morality). 
65
 G. H. C. BODENHAUSEN, GUIDE TO THE APPLICATION OF THE PARIS CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF 
INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY, 114 (1968). 
66
 See Council Regulation 40/94, art. 7(1)(f), 1993 O.J. (L 11) 1, 4 (EC) available at 
http://oami.europa.eu/en/mark/aspects/reg/reg4094.htm (mandating that “trade marks which are contrary to public 
policy or to accepted principles of morality” not be registered). 
67
 See id. (“The following shall not be registered . . . (f) trade marks which are contrary to public policy or to 
accepted principles of morality”).   
68
 Anne Gilson LaLonde, Trademarks Laid Bare: Marks That May Be Scandalous or Immoral, 101 TRADEMARK 
REP. 1476 (Sept.-Oct. 2011)  
69
 Model State Trademark Bill § 2 (1964) (reprinted in J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON 
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 22:8 (4th ed. 1998)). 
70
 See Stephen R. Baird, Moral Intervention in the Trademark Arena: Banning the Registration of Scandalous and 
Immoral Trademarks, 83 TRADEMARK REP. 661, 793-794 (1993). 
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disparage . . . persons, living or dead, institutions, beliefs or national symbols, or bring them into 
contempt, or disrepute.”
71
   
 
While we tend to think of the disparagement clause as protecting subjugated groups from 
marks that perpetuate discrimination, the immoral and scandalous bars as well as the “bring them 
into contempt” language broadens the protection against offensive trademarks.  These terms 
taken together can be thought of as indicting a category of words that cause grave offense to the 
public that is of a non-commercial nature.  As a result of Section 2(a), the trademark office must 
screen racist marks, such as KNIGGA,
72
 misogynistic marks, such as GET IN THE KITCHEN 
BIT@HES!,
73
 and marks that offend religious and ethnic minorities such as KHORAN for 
wine.
74
   
 
Many of the marks that cause offense to religious groups have been dealt with under the 
scandalous bar.  Thus, the marks MADONNA for wine,
75
 MESSIAS for wine and brandy,
76
 
BUDDHA BEACHWARE for apparel,
77
 SENUSSI for tobacco,
78
 and MOONIES for dolls that 
drop their pants
79
 were all analyzed not under the disparagement clause, but under the standard 
for scandalous marks.  In 2010, the TTAB, in a case involving the mark KHORAN for wine, 
explicitly addressed this situation and suggested that the disparaging bar was moor appropriate 
for religious marks.
80
  Recently, for instance, the registration of the mark STOP THE 
ISLAMATION OF AMERICA was refused under Section 2(a) because it was disparaging to 




In addition to marks that offend religions, misogynistic marks have also tended to be 
                                                 
71
 See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a), supra note 1. 
72
 U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 76/639548. 
73
 BITCHES, Registration No. 4406626 (for food mixers and whisks). 
74
 Apparently, the word “Khoran” is Armenian for altar, which is why a company sought to register the mark 
“Khoran” for wine in the United States.  In re Lebanese Arak Corp., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1215 (T.T.A.B. 2010).  
But should such a trademark be registered by the U.S. government when it, being phonetically equivalent to the 
sacred text of Islam, may offend Muslims when used to denote an alcoholic beverage? 
75
 In re Riverbank Canning Co., 95 F.2d 327 (25 C.C.P.A. 1028) (declining to approve registration for the 
commercial use of the Virgin Mary’s name on wine bottles because it would be “shocking” to many people). 
76
 IL MESSIA, Registration No. 4093035.  
77
 In re Hines, 31 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1685, 1687 (T.T.A.B 1994) (allowing the mark BUDDA BEACHWEAR because 
there was insufficient evidence to demonstrate that a substantial composite of Buddhist would be offended by the 
mark in the context of clothing). 
78
 In re Reemtsma Cigarettenfabriken G.M.B.H., 122 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 339 (T.T.A.B. 1959). 
79
 In re In Over Our Heads, Inc., 16 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1653 (T.T.A.B. 1990) (allowing registration of the mark 
MOONIES because it did not disparage Reverend Sun Myung Moon, referring rather to dolls that “mooned” or 
dropped their pants). 
80
 In re Lebanese Arak Corp., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1215, 1216 (T.T.A.B. 2010) (denying the mark because it 
would disparage a substantial composite of Muslims) 
81
 In re Geller, 2013-1412, 2014 WL 1887661 (Fed. Cir. May 13, 2014) (affirming the TTAB’s decision to refuse 
registration, recognizing that the “majority of Muslims are not terrorists and [would be] offended by being 
associated as such . . . .”).  
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dealt with under the scandalousness bar.  Thus marks such as ONLY A BREAST IN THE 
MOUTH IS BETTER THAN A LEG IN THE HAND for restaurant services
82
 and BLACK 
TAIL for “an adult entertainment magazine featuring photographs of both naked and scantily-
clad African-American women”
83
 were analyzed not as disparaging to women, but as 
scandalous. 
 
These statutory descriptions—“immoral,” “scandalous,” and “may disparage”—have 
produced not one, not three, but oddly two separate doctrines.  Although “immoral” and 
“scandalous” are different words, which would ordinarily result in statutory interpretation that 
affords each word a separate meaning, case law has combined the two words into the same 
category.
84
  Scandalous means shocking to the sense of propriety; offensive to the conscience or 
moral feeling; or calling out for condemnation.
85
  Scandalous has also been held to include that 
which is “vulgar,” or “lacking in taste, indelicate, morally crude.”
86
  The standard for refusing 
“scandalous” or “immoral” marks under Section 2(a) is tested against the perceptions of a 
substantial composite of the general public.  This standard is in contrast to the disparagement 
doctrine, which significantly tests the mark against the perceptions of the targeted group.  
 
Section 2(a) requires the trademark office to screen the content of the marks and 
determine the meaning of words in order to protect the public from harmful marks.  The 
trademark examining attorney may cite evidence derived from dictionaries and news articles.
87
  
And in that sense it is no different from many other trademark determinations.  In addition to the 
harm being non-commercial, the only difference is that the words whose meaning are at issue 
tend to affect different groups of people differently.  And therein lies the controversy. 
 
B. Burdens on Challengers 
 
Whereas a challenge to an offensive mark could be as straight forward as opening a 
dictionary to determine whether a mark is immoral, scandalous or disparaging, instead U.S. law 
has developed in such a way as to throw many significant hurdles before challengers.
88
  For 
instance, the test for disparagement was declared as involving two steps.  First, one must 
determine the likely meaning of the trademark—taking into account not only dictionary 
definition, but also any figurative elements of the trademark, the nature of the goods or services 
                                                 
82
 Bromberg v. Carmel Self Service, Inc., 198 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 176 (T.T.A.B. 1978). 
83
 In re Mavety Media Group Ltd., 33 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
84
 See In re McGinley, 660 F.2d 481, 484 n.6, 211 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 668, 673 n.6 (C.C.P.A. 1981), aff’g 206 
U.S.P.Q. 753 (T.T.A.B. 1979) (holding it unnecessary to evaluate whether a mark was immoral after the court found 
it to be scandalous).  
85
 McGinley, 660 F.2d at 486, 211 U.S.P.Q. at 673.  
86
 In re Runsdorf, 171 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 443, 444 (T.T.A.B. 1971). 
87
 TMEP (5th ed. Sept. 2007) § 1203.01. (In order to refuse a mark under § 2(a) grounds, a trademark examining 
attorney must offer evidence that a substantial section of the public would consider the mark offensive. This 
evidence can be in the form of dictionary definitions, newspaper articles, or magazine articles).  
88
 See Christine Haight Farley, Stabilizing Morality in Trademark Law, 63 Am. U. L. Rev. 101 (2014). 
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associated with the trademark, and the manner in which the trademark is used in the marketplace.  
Second, there should be evidence that the trademark’s meaning is more likely than not 
disparaging to a substantial composite of the referenced group.
89
  Thus, in order to succeed, the 
Native American challengers must present sufficient evidence that a substantial composite of 
Native Americans regard the term REDSKINS as disparaging when used as a trademark by the 
football team.
90
   
 
Within this test, a couple of significant policy choices were made.  Two in particular will 
frustrate challengers of offensive marks and confound the courts that decide these cases.
91
  First, 
the relevant sector of the public whose offense must be gauged was determined to be the 
referenced group.  Thus, surveys of the general public will not be relevant.  If the entire public is 
affected by the mark, as psychological evidence has demonstrated, why then only focus on the 
targeted group?  This rule creates a burden on minority group to raise the objection and explain 
the harm from a minority perspective, but in a way that the majority can understand.   
 
Second, it was determined that the allegedly disparaging content must be evaluated in the 
context of the mark’s use.  Therefore, the question is not what the meaning of “redskin” is, but 
instead what the meaning is in the context of its use as a professional football team name.   
 
Most likely in an attempt to be as circumscribed as possible, the Faleomavaega bill to 
prohibit the registration of the word Redskins
92
 also adopts a highly contextualized evaluation of 
the allegedly disparaging mark.  The broad pronouncement of a presumption of disparagement is 
qualified by the need to be used with references to or images of Native Americans, or the need to 
be used in a way that is commonly understood to refer to Native Americans. This formulation 
thus permits the registration of REDSKINS for use with redskin potatoes.
93
  Other than being 
explicitly directed to marks containing the word “redskin,” this legislation then does little to 
change the current rules.  What it does do is predetermine that a racial reference containing the 
word “redskin” is per se disparaging.  This legislation, if passed, would then present a path to 
success for the challengers of the REDSKINS mark.  For other groups disparaged by racially 
insulting marks, it would do nothing. 
 
C. A Limited Remedy 
                                                 
89
 In re Geller, 2013-1412, 2014 WL 1887661, *1, 10 (Fed. Cir. May 13, 2014) (quoting In re Lebanese Arak Corp., 
94 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1217).  
90
 Harjo v. Pro Football, Inc., 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705 (T.T.A.B. 1999), rev’d, 284 F. Supp. 2d 96, 68 
U.S.P.Q.2d 1225 (D.D.C. 2003), remanded, 415 F.3d 44, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d 1525 (D.C. Cir. 2005); see also In re 
Geller, 2013-1412, 2014 WL 1887661 at *10 (determining that the word “STOP” in connection with the religious 
meaning of “islamation” conveys a negative tone and suggests that the conversion to Islam is “undesirable.”).  
91
 Another determination was made that the requisite level offense must be perceived by a “substantial composite.”  
This is clearly a quantitative assessment, and although it is not clear what the threshold percentage is, it is likely 
more than merely “some.” . 
92
 See supra note 13. 
93
 There is an application for WASHINGTON REDSKIN POTATOES.  U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 




Like other jurisdictions, U.S. trademark law only seeks to regulate the registration of 
offensive trademarks and is not so ambitious in attempting to regulate the use of offensive 
trademarks.  This policy means that a trademark deemed offensive and therefore denied 
registration can still legally be used in the marketplace.  Therefore, if the Native Americans are 
victorious in their case against the football team, the only legal result would be the cancelation of 
the registrations of the REDSKINS trademark. The team, however, would still be legally entitled 
to continue their use of the mark in commerce without interference.  Such results prove that these 
trademark laws are a very limited regulation of offensive speech. 
 
In fact, trademarks deemed too immoral, scandalous, or disparaging to be registered may 
still be protected by the Lanham Act as common law trademarks if they have been used as source 
indicators in commerce.  So not only does U.S. trademark law fail to prohibit the use of offensive 
trademarks, but they may still be protected in U.S. courts as common law trademarks.  It remains 
an open question whether an offensive mark whose registration has been cancelled under Section 




The only case to directly address the constitutionality of Section 2(a) held that the 
provision does not violate the First Amendment because no conduct is proscribed and no tangible 
form of expression is suppressed.
95
  Thus, Section 2(a) may be constitutional only because it is 
directed only at registration, and not use.   
 
The sine qua non of trademark law is that trademark rights derive from use, not 
registration.  Registration merely provides extra federal benefits.
96
  The registration of a 
trademark is a federally granted benefit; it is not a constitutionally enshrined right.  Trademarks 
containing offensive terms should not enjoy the benefits of federal registration.  Significant 
benefits flow from the issuance of a trademark registration for the United States trademark 
office.  The benefits of registration include nationwide constructive notice, original jurisdiction 
in federal courts, the presumption of validity of the mark, the possibility of incontestable status, 
border measures, attorneys’ fees and costs, and statutory damages.
97
  These benefits once 
conferred by the trademark office may actually be granted by other government actors such as 
agencies and federal courts.
98
  For these reasons, by granting these trademarks federal 
registration, the government is putting its imprimatur on the offensive trademark. 
 
                                                 
94
 Baird has addressed the question of whether a scandalous immoral or disparaging mark may nevertheless receive 
protection under section 43(a) and has concluded that protection will likely be denied based on public policy 
reasons.  Baird, supra note 67, at 661. 
95
 In re McGinley, 660 F.2d 484, 84-85, 211 USPQ (BNA) 668, 672 (1981).  
96
 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 19.01[3] (4th ed. 1998). 
97
 See U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, What are the Benefits of Federal Trademark Registration?, USPTO.COM 
(last modified Apr. 23, 2013, 10:26 AM), http://www.uspto.gov/faq/trademarks.jsp#_Toc275426681.  
98
 See also Jennifer Ward, Trademarks 101, 15 UTAH BAR J. (2D SER.) 18, 20 (Apr. 2002). 
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If these trademark doctrines do not prohibit the use of offensive trademarks, then what 
impact, if any, do they have? Surely the Native Americans who challenged the REDSKINS 
trademark would prefer to ban the use of the trademark rather than to just ban the registration of 
the trademark.  Nonetheless, the registration of a trademark by a national government has the 
symbolic effect of the government giving its stamp of approval to the trademark. Obviously, if 
that trademark deeply offends a minority, it may appear that the government condones the use of 
such offensive language.
99
  Therefore, this legal restriction provides governments with an 
opportunity to refuse to lend the support of the administration to those trademarks that offend the 
public.  Merchants should take heed and consumers should take notice of the determinations 
made under Section 2(a).  Thus the government can perform important signaling for civility 
without abridging the freedom of speech. 
 
One would expect a correlation between being granted a registration and going into 
business with the mark.  Perhaps businesses use the standards applied by the trademark office as 
a guide for appropriateness in the marketplace.  Relatedly, the public may react differently to 
offensive marks when they learn that the trademark office has issued a registration and thus 
deemed them acceptable.  If these speculations are well founded, the impact of these 
determinations goes well beyond its effect on the registry.   
 
What would happen if the Native American challengers won their case?  Would Pro-
Football change their team name?  They have said they would not and the law would not require 
them to. It is possible that Pro-Football could maintain common law trademark rights in the 
canceled marks. That is, were Pro-Football to lose its registration, the team might still be able to 
enforce its common law trademark rights against anyone who would infringe its mark. As noted, 
this question has not yet been addressed by any court.  On the one hand, a court faced with this 
issue may refuse to grant an injunction on behalf of a party who comes to court with a mark that 
has been declared to be disparaging. On the other hand, the constitutionality of Section 2(a) has 




Thus, after years of litigation, it is possible that the Native American challengers will 
have won the lawsuit, but failed to effect any change in the use of the mark.  This case then 
starkly advances the question of whether the provision makes good policy. For if minority 
groups are injured by the use of trademark in the way that the amici have suggested,
101
 and the 
only remedy provided by trademark law is cancellation of the registration of the trademark, then 
the effort and expense of challenging the trademark may have been wasted.  Alternatively, the 
symbolic gesture of the federal government cancelling the registration of a trademark on the 
basis that it disparages people may be significant and affect the way society views the mark. 
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VI. The Policy Justifications for Content Restrictions in Trademark Law 
 
Although there is not much in the legislative record of Section 2(a) that is particularly 
revealing in terms of indicating Congress’s larger purpose in enacting this provision,
102
 the 
language of the section itself makes its objective reasonably clear.  It appears that the objective is 
simply to ban offensive words from the trademark registry.  Again, the refusal of registration 





It has been suggested that the justifications for imposing this content restriction on 
trademark registrations are the following: 1) the federal government should protect the public 
from offensive trademarks; 2) the federal government should discourage the use of offensive 
trademarks; 3) the federal government should not squander its time and resources on offensive 
trademarks; and 4) the federal government should not create the appearance that it approves the 
use of such trademarks.
104
 The Redskins case, the most litigated and most scrutinized case 
brought under Section 2(a), provides a useful context to measure of these policy goals.  
 
Analyzing these justifications in order, we see first, that the federal government in fact 
has a very limited ability to protect the public from offensive trademarks.  Since the public 
generally does not come into contact with the trademark registry, whether or not a trademark is 
listed there does not threaten to injure the public.  And since Section 2(a) does not permit the 
federal government to prohibit the use of offensive trademarks, it can do little to protect the 
public from being injured by such marks.  The public ought not to be confronted by trademarks 
that disturb, abuse, insult, or threaten them, but this provision offers no shield. 
 
The second policy justification for Section 2(a) is that it discourages the use of offensive 
trademarks.  Ideally, trademark applicants would consider the benefits of registration when 
deciding on a trademark, and would steer clear from offensive trademarks, at least, out of 
concern that they would only receive common law protection.  The trouble with this policy 
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objective is that it has proven to be difficult to predict which trademarks will be barred 
registration under Section 2(a).
105
  In a large number of cases, the same word has been both 
registered and denied registration.
106
  For instance, although REDSKINS was registered for a 
football team, it was denied registration for pork rinds.
107
  Likewise, SQUAW was registered for 
ski equipment,
108
 but denied for apparel,
109
 HEEB was registered for magazines,
110
 but denied 
for clothing,
111
 SLANT was registered for food serving ware,
112





The third justification is that the federal government should not expend its time and 
resources on offensive trademarks.  Since the trademark office must review every application 
under all of the prohibitions in Section 2, any wasted time and resources must be measured after 
the registration determination has been made.  In the case of the REDSKINS trademarks, in 
addition to publishing the trademark for opposition, and then again as a registered trademark, the 
trademark office has had to be involved with all of the maintenance filings associated with these 
registrations including the filing of specimens, Section 8 affidavits, Section 15 affidavits, and 
renewals. In addition, the TTAB has been involved in the inter party proceeding for years.  Had 
the trademarks been refused registration, the TTAB may have had to hear an appeal of the 
examiner’s rejection. Even if this appeal would have been brought, it presumably would have 
been a smaller matter than the full litigation that it has experienced.  The result is a prime 
example of how the federal government has expended significant resources on an offensive 
trademark. 
 
Finally and most significantly, we come to the question of whether by permitting the 
registration of an offensive trademark the federal government creates the appearance that it 
approves of such marks. It is on this point that the Redskins case offers the greatest insight.  
Native Americans have sought to persuade Pro-Football to abandon the REDSKINS trademark 
ever since it was registered. They have sought to do this through  private meetings with team 
management, as well as in public opinion shaping campaigns.
114
  Unfortunately, these efforts 
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have had little, if any, impact. It was not until publicity about the cancellation proceeding 
emerged that momentum began to form around this effort. It was thus important that first, there 
was a legal ground upon which to challenge the mark and second, there was a legal standard of 
protection for disparaged groups.  These two principles have enabled this issue to capture public 
interest and to maintain a public debate about the appropriateness of these trademarks. The law 
may not require Pro-Football to change its name, but the public may eventually demand it.  
Should the federal government in the form of the TTAB decide that the REDSKINS mark should 
be canceled because it is a disparaging trademark, the government willhave sent a strong 
message that it does not approve of such hateful marks. This indicia of difference would no 
longer be legally recognized by the federal government.  This would be a victory for the 





A trademark registration can be challenged as being immoral, scandalous, or disparaging 
by members of the public. But it is quite an arduous undertaking for a group of private citizens to 
mount a challenge to an offensive trademark. For this reason, many countries’ trademark laws 
permit trademark examiners to refuse registration of offensive marks on their own. The 
exclusionary impact of disparaging language must become issue for all members of the 
community and not a special burden for the stigmatized group.   
 
 As a society, we owe a debt of gratitude to those who mount such challenges.  In many 
cases of offensive trademarks, the trademark may deeply offend a minority, while the majority 
may be insensitive or unaware of the offense.  These challenges become opportunities for all of 
us improve our awareness of cultural sensitivities.  And this has certainly been the case in the 
REDSKINS dispute. 
 
For decades indigenous peoples have fought to protect themselves from the public 
humiliation and discrimination associated with racial slurs such as “redskin.”  The use of the 
word is hurtful and insulting to our nation's first inhabitants and their descendants.  Racist 
trademarks tear at the fabric of society by promoting negative stereotypes of minority groups. 
There is a strong public interest in eliminating damaging stereotypes and stigmatization.  The 
social costs to the public at large are huge and include reinforcing hateful and erroneous 
stereotypes and misinformation about our fellow citizens.  The psychological harms of such 
racialized representations impact not only the referenced group but also society as a whole.   The 
public acceptance of hateful language against one group suggests tolerance of other hateful 
language and treatment toward other groups. 
 
In these larger issues of racial identity, civility, and community, obviously trademark law 
plays a very minor role.  But as some of these disputes—such as the REDSKINS dispute—
demonstrate, on occasion this small role can be an important one. 
